Bridging the Divide: Beyond the Ethics of Disagreement,Bridging the Divide: Beyond the Ethics of Disagreement, by Dr. Taha Jabir Al-Alwani

Reviewed by: Dr Nazar Ul Islam 

Imam Abu Hanifa is reported to have said, "Ours is no more than an opinion; we do not oblige or coerce anyone into accepting it. Whosoever has better judgment, let him advance."

The difference of opinion and the disagreement among the Muslims is rooted in history, in philology, and in the phenomenology of Muslim culture and tradition. The greatest ever divide - between Shia and Sunni- is rooted in political, theological, and socio-cultural factors, primarily arising from contentious issue of succession of leadership after the demise of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). In the same manner, the juristic difference among the Muslims within Shia (Ja‘fari, Zaydi, Isma‘ili) and Sunni creed created intra-sectarian divides in the form of sectarianism. The question, however, remains is how can this Ummah return to unity? We observe various efforts being made to understand and explicate the methods to unite Ummah through revival and reform. Over the past four centuries the popular slogans within the Muslim tradition have emphasized “go back to Quran and Sunnah”, and adopting the method of Salf e Saliheen (First three generations of Muslims). Winston Churchill in his critique of the Muslim societies said that the decline is the Muslim World is because they have closed the doors of Ijtihad (independent reasoning). For Ibn Taymiyyah it was Scholasticism, philosophy and Sufism together that led to the aberrations from Quran and Sunnah. These critiques latter on resonated in a systematic way in Muhammd Ibn Abdul Wahab who put a great importance in reestablishing the Islamic monotheism Tawhid through Quran Sunnah and Salaf’s methodology.

However, in the beginning to 20^th century Allama Iqbal advocated a philosophical renewal fundamentally rooted in Quran and modern epistemology.  He not only challenged blind imitation Taqlid but he also urged Ijtihad, and envisioned a unified Muslim identity beyond sectarianism. But Iqbal’s thought was rooted in metaphysics and poetry rather than in formal theology and Jurisprudence.  Similarly, Tariq Ramadhan in our times has advocated for Ijtihad. He is a great critique of sectarianism and finds Quran and Sunnah as possible way to address contemporary issues. However, his work is more rooted in sociology and philosophy rather than in Jurisprudence. Taha Jabir Alwani’s work revving the balance lays the epistemological foundation and reasserts the Quranic supremacy over the Hadīth and in legal and theological framework. As pointed out by Mobin Veid it is here that we encounter Alalwani’s central thesis­:

 that the Qur’an as the receptacle of word and command has been subordinated to the weight of “narrative”  hegemony represented by the pro-phetic Sunnah, allowing jurists to postulate any number of rulings that, at best, relect merely circumstantial and discretionary opinion and, at worst, subversions of the divine command whilst maintaining attribution to God.

 The two-volume work Bridging the Divide: Beyond the Ethics of Disagreement, by Dr. Taha Jabir Al-Alwani published by International institute of Islamic Thought (IIT) in 2024 is one such shout out for Muslim unity- bridging the divide- that according to the author can be achieved by revisiting the foundational ethos of the Qur'an and Sunnah, avoiding blind imitation (taqlid) in jurisprudence while prioritizing independent reasoning (Ijtihad), discouraging divisive scholastic exercises in theology, and bridging the gap between theological principles and political theory. The author, Al-Alwani, challenges the well-established notion of sectarianism and theological fragmentation that continues to afflict the Muslim Ummah. Through a historical and methodological lens, he distinguishes between the genuine juristic diversity of early Islamic scholarship—rooted in Ijtihād and scholarly integrity—and the later misappropriations that elevated disagreement to a point of division. He questions the misuse of scriptural texts such as Qur’ān (10:99, 6:159, 6:6:65) and the oft-quoted but controversial Hadīth “Disagreement in my Ummah is a mercy” as weak (gharib), revealing how these traditions have been decontextualised to serve political interests rather than religious unity. This work advocates for inclusivity in Muslim thought in which diversity is acknowledged but not weaponize, and unity is pursued not through uniformity but through shared commitment to divine guidance. The idea of ‘unity of thought’ seems a utopian cry- an idealism that is impossible to achieve in a culturally and linguistically diverse Ummah. 

The book makes an attempt to manage the crisis of discord/disagreement, through regaining the missing dimension of faith that has resulted in the lack of unity among the Muslims, which is achievable through gaining proper knowledge of Islam. Once we revisit the foundations of Islam (Quran and Sunnah), we will find that the Holy Qur’ān strictly prohibits discord and says, “those who have broken Unity, you have nothing to do with them” (8:48, 6:159). We find in history a good number of reform movements Islah like Tablighi, and Deoband movement in Sub-continent who have vigorously worked to revive the faith and spirituality. 

The author in the first part of the book deliberates on his previous stance on the ethics of disagreement as historically seen or perceived by the Muslims. We find a spectrum of disagreements in the tradition  conceptually framed on dialectics-ranging from differences in Fiqh, to theological differences like between (Asharite’s and Mutazilite’s), philosophical dialectics between (Ibn Sina and Al Ghazali), and  Sufi dialectics debating form and substance of esoteric knowledge. There are also disputations (Jadal), dissensions (Shiqaq), acceptable and unacceptable differences, and differences that are considered as evil. Historically, we find examples where Prophet Muhammad (saw) allowed the different opinions to exist, like the famous episode of prayer timings of companions during the battle of confederates but prophet also knew the inevitability, therefore, he warned against the dire consequences of disagreement. This is the reason why he taught the manners in which disagreement was observed.

Among the Companions, differences of opinion existed in various forms, and one of them was based on Qur’ānic interpretation (ta’wil). However, the Companions’ ijtihad (independent reasoning) reached to agreement most of the time, and they disliked disagreement; this was attested by Ibn Mas’ud, who said, 'Disagreement is evil.' The first-generation Muslims had differences on many issues, beginning with the burial of the Prophet Muhammad, Zakat, and many other juristic matters, which were resolved through mutual consensus, and they held each other in high esteem despite disagreements between Abu Bakr and Umar, Umar and Ali, Ali and Ibn Mas’ud, Ibn Abbas and Zayd ibn Thabit, the debates of Ibn Abbas with the Kharijites, and Ali and Mu’awiya (pp. 52–54).

The ethics of disagreement among the second generation of Muslims were continued by the ethics and higher standards of the Companions. However, it is pertinent to mention that the differences that existed among the early generations of Muslims were juristic in nature. However, after the assassination of Uthman, a political schism began to fracture the Ummah. The rise of various schools was found in Iraq, such as the Jahmiyyah, Mu’tazilah, Shia, and Kharijiyyah, as well as numerous innovators and idiosyncratic groups (p. 59). During this period, we find heated exchanges of debates among the founders of schools of jurisprudence and scholars of the Hijaz and Iraq; controversies were intense, and criticism was rigorously exchanged. Nevertheless, neither side forsook the ethics and proper standards of behavior in their disagreements (p. 62). The author mentions Imam Abu Hanifa, who is reported to have said, 'Ours is no more than an opinion; we do not oblige or coerce anyone into accepting it. Whosoever has better judgment, let him advance' (p. 58). Some of the major differences were apparent in the juristic thought of Imams Abu Hanifa and Shafi’i, including the rejection of istihsan (juristic opinion), the use of qiyas (analogy), the use of al-masalih al-mursalah, and the rejection of proof based on the practices of the people of Medina. Imam Shafi’i was critical of the Hanafiyyah for their non-compliance with many Sunnah practices, as the hadith on which they were based failed to meet his criteria. Major schools differed from one another on qiyas; even the Zahiri school rejected istihsan, maslahah mursalah, and munqati’ hadith (p. 72).

A case study of the word qur’ in the Qur’ān is worth mentioning; Imam Shafi’i interpreted the word as menstruation, Imam Abu Hanifa interpreted it as ‘purity.’ Consequently, divorce was calculated based on three occurrences of menstruation by Iraqi scholars and three occurrences of purity by Hijazi scholars. Despite differences in politics, jurisprudence, and Hadīth, these scholars (aimmah) always performed Salah behind one another (p. 85). As Ijtihad, or analytical thought, came to an end in the 14th century of the Muslim era, blind imitation (taqlid) began to flourish. People began following early scholars rather than thinking for themselves; whenever they faced any problem related to religion, they turned to these scholars for help (p. 101), and would later be named Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, Hanbali, and so forth.

However, the political differences were of a more serious nature, generating clashes and violence among Muslims. One such case according to the author was the separation of scholarship from politics; a significant divide between the 'intellectual class and political class'. This divide spread like a disease (p. 103). According to the author, the primary reason for this divide was the scholars’ lack of knowledge in 'Islamic political theory and practice.

The second volume of the book Preserving Unity and Avoiding Division: A New Approach to the Ethics of Disagreement in Islam has six chapters. This volume is an evolution and reevaluation of the author’s previous stance on the 'Ethics of Disagreement.' The author clarifies various points on which he was previously mistaken and now expresses his evolved understanding of the pernicious causes of disunity among Muslims. The introduction is an extension of Part 1 of the first volume. The method he adheres to in this second volume is wholly based on the Qur’ān. Thus, this volume includes additions, connections, and clarifications. In this regard, Chapter 1 forms the genesis of the ethics of disagreement, as reflected in Volume I, but with certain additions and clarifications, such as how various schools differed from one another in their methods of deduction in Islamic jurisprudence and reached different conclusions in resolving juristic issues in Islam; and how blind imitation of this methodology led to stagnation in Islam, thereby intensifying differences in the next generation. The blind following and rigid adherence to these schools led to the extrapolation of the juristic thought of the four Imams. The differences, initially based on linguistic, grammatical, and other intellectual reasons, were later sparked by selfish whims and arrogance, including desires for egotism or willful gratification (V2, p. 2)."

The discussion of the Holy Qur’ān is central throughout the book, but the desire and will to return to Qur’ānic teachings intensify in the second volume. The Qur’ān does not encourage differences but rather unity among Muslims. The author emphasizes that one of the basic flaws committed by various sects is- extracting verses from the Qur’ān to justify their existence and prove their theology correct. One such Qur’ānic verse is: 'And had your Sustainer so willed, He could have surely made all mankind one single community, but (He willed it otherwise), and so they continue to hold divergent views, (all of them) save those upon whom your Sustainer has bestowed His grace' (Qur’ān, Hud 11:118–119), and the Prophetic tradition, 'Al-Ikhtilāf fi Ummati Rahmah' ('The differences among my followers are a mercy'). The author disagrees with those scholars and reiterates that 'disagreements are neither natural nor a law of the cosmos' (V2, p. 28), because the Islamic discourse of the Ummah, revealed by God, progresses toward unity rather than disunity, which is to be achieved through wisdom and da’wah rather than force, and the binding force in achieving that unity is the oneness of God and the Holy Qur’ān."

The major blow to the idea of unity was struck by scholasticism, particularly the academic debates on theology and sectology in Al-Milal wa al-Nihal. The idea of scholasticism in the beginning was to address the doubts of intellectuals or detractors. The problem with this theology was that it couldn’t provide documentary evidence from the Qur’ān; instead, it relied on logic and rational proofs. As a consequence, the basic text that could have united Muslims intellectually—the Qur’ān—was less considered, the concept of the Ummah was increasingly eclipsed, and various sects began to emerge. This was followed by the external expansion of the state and less focus on the core concept of the Ummah as one community.

Scholastic theology, which initially served as a defense against other faiths, was used against Muslims themselves; multiple interpretations of the Qur’ān and forged Ahadith contributed to an entire science of Al-Milal wa al-Nihal. Scholastic theology resulted only in sectarianism, a serious allegation and claim made by the author throughout this book. Ilm al-Kalam also began to show methodological errors, such as decontextualization (V2, p. 48). The reason scholars of scholasticism did not focus on the Qur’ān was their claim that it contains allegorical meanings, ambiguities, and multiple interpretations. Just as juristic thought was a blessing in the beginning but later developed into sects through taqlid, fanatical adherence to scholastic theology created an intellectual crisis. We witnessed the Jabariyyah, Ash’ariyyah, Mu’tazilah, and the conflict and violence among them as they sought to prove their superiority through political patronage. The abandonment of the principle that sacred texts are infallible and unchangeable (V2, p. 92) led to the  softening approach towards the texts, rendering them fluid and liberal in interpretation and making them cryptic to understand, exacerbated disunity.

The practice of reading the Qur’ān in a decontextualized manner, which the author calls an atomistic fashion rather than as an integral whole, has led to the erosion of Qur’ānic authority. The Qur’ān must be the point of reference against which all other texts are to be measured (V2, p. 121); anything not consistent with the Qur’ān is vanity. The argument that the Qur’ān and other Islamic texts were insufficient in and of themselves to address the myriad political situations and conundrums with which human individuals and societies are faced was allowed to flourish by scholastic theologians (pp. 123–124). Scholastic theology also separated doctrine from politics, resulting in the caliph being perceived as someone who deals with earthly affairs (p. 126). This has led to disunity among Muslims.

However, traditional scholars made commitments to unity and peacemaking among Muslims. One such criterion for the unity was the utterance of the Kalimah; prayer also unites Muslims. It creates a sense of unity, cohesion, cooperation, and, above all, peace (p. 148). The cordial relations among the aimmah (scholars) need to be highlighted. The academic exchanges between Hanafis and Zaydis, between Hasan al-Basri and Jabir ibn Zayd, and the academic opposition among various schools, such as between Imams Malik and Abu Hanifa, and between the Twelver Shia and Hanafis, are not only refined in academic discussion but also embody proper ethics in diversity.

References

1.      Al-Alwani, T. J. (1993). The ethics of disagreement in Islam (A. Hamid, Trans.). International Institute of Islamic Thought. (Original work published 1986)

2.      Al-Alwani, T. J. (2024). Preserving unity and avoiding division: A new approach to the ethics of disagreement in Islam (N. Roberts, Trans.). The International Institute of Islamic Thought. https://iiit.org/wp-content/uploads/Preserving-Unity-and-Avoiding-Division.pdf

3.      Al-‘Alwani, T. J. (2011). The ethics of disagreement in Islam (A. W. Hamid, Trans.). International Institute of Islamic Thought. (Original work published 1984)

4.      Ali, M. Y. (2015). Understanding change and changeability: The ethics of disagreement in Islamic thought. Journal of Academic Perspectives, 2015(3), 1-29.

5.      Majid, K. (2015). Ikhtilaf and unity in Muslim ummah: A comparative analysis. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, 4(3), 10-16